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Abstract 
Given the significance of forecasting in real estate investment decisions, this paper 
investigates forecast uncertainty and disagreement in real estate market forecasts.  Using the 
Investment Property Forum (IPF) quarterly survey amongst UK independent real estate 
forecasters, these real estate forecasts are compared with actual real estate performance to 
assess a number of real estate forecasting issues in the UK over 1999-2004, including real 
estate forecast error, bias and consensus. The results suggest that real estate forecasts 
are biased, less volatile compared to market returns and inefficient in that forecast 
errors tend to persist.    The strongest finding is that real estate forecasters display the 
characteristics associated with a consensus indicating herding. 
 
Keywords: Real estate forecasting, forecast accuracy, forecast disagreement, consensus.  
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INTRODUCTION 
For institutional real estate investors, expectations of future investment performance at the 
levels of individual real estate asset, sector, region, country and asset class are crucial to stock 
selection, and tactical and strategic asset allocation decisions. While all real estate forecasting 
is subject to some degree of uncertainty, a high degree of sophistication has been developed 
over recent years, with a range of advanced quantitative and qualitative procedures now used 
by institutional investors in real estate forecasting, including judgemental procedures, 
causal/econometric procedures and time series/trend analysis procedures (Higgins, 2000). 
This has seen numerous real estate forecasting studies in recent years concerning forecasting 
real estate rents, stock levels, returns, yields and cash flows; econometric and structural 
modelling, and comparisons of real estate forecasting procedures (see Newell et al, 2003). 
 
Given the centrality of forecasting to real estate investment decisions and performance, the 
focus in this paper is on uncertainty in forecasts of real estate rents and returns, and 
disagreement in expectations.  Uncertainty is an integral element of forecasts, and commercial 
real estate investors are constantly in the position of decision-making under uncertainty.  
“Forecasting competitions” suggest that the use of econometric modelling that dominates 
professional real estate forecasting can sometimes be of limited value.  Confirming many 
studies outside the real estate sector, real estate  researchers have found, in many instances, 
simple forecasts (e.g. via naïve predictors) to be more accurate than using complex 
econometric models (Chaplin, 1999, 2000; Higgins, 2001; Wilson et al, 2000).  Further, in 
macro-economic forecasts, non-causal models often tend to dominate causal models (Hendry 
and Clements, 1999).   
 
This paper focuses on two dimensions of forecast uncertainty; namely, accuracy and 
disagreement.  Drawing upon a data set of professional forecasts of UK real estate market 
performance over 1999-2004, we investigate these real estate forecasts in terms of forecast 
error, bias and efficiency.  We also examine the extent and nature of disagreement among 
professional real estate forecasters.  In most standard micro-economic models, market 
participants are assumed to share a common information set and to form similar expectations 
conditional upon that information.  However, there has been growing interest in the fact that 
market participants often disagree.  The topic of forecast disagreement (outside real estate) 
has generated a substantial body of research (see below) focussing on sources and causes of 
forecast disagreement and, interestingly, signals and information contained in forecast 
disagreement. 
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FORECAST FAILURE: UNCERTAINTY, ACCURACY AND RATIONALITY IN 
FORECASTS  
 
The discussion about the different dimensions of forecast uncertainty echoes much of the 
debate on appraisal uncertainty and smoothing (e.g: Webb, 1994; Clayton, Geltner and 
Hamilton, 2001).  The same distinctions are drawn between random variations between actual 
outcomes and predicted outcomes (error), and systematic tendencies towards optimism or 
pessimism (bias).  Similarly, the large body of research on forecast bias reproduces similar 
concepts found in research on appraisal-smoothing.    As in real estate, the term ‘forecast 
smoothing’ is used in the forecast literature to describe the tendency of forecasts to be less 
volatile than reality and to be display serial correlation. Clements (1995) identifies a tendency 
towards excessive smoothness in forecasts.  Nordhaus (1987) speculates that the lack of 
volatility in forecasts, relative to actual outcomes, is due to factors such as the need to reach a 
consensus and to maintain forecast credibility by avoiding major “jumps”.  In research that 
assessed the accuracy of real estate market forecasts in the UK over 1999-2002, Newell et al 
(2003) found empirical evidence of forecast inertia. Newell et al (2003) concluded that 
persistent over-estimation and under-estimation, manifested in serial correlation in forecast 
errors, suggested a smoothing effect in which significant new information is needed before 
major revisions to prior real estate forecasts are carried out.   
 
Forecast bias is closely linked to tests of efficiency and rationality in forecasts.  Rational 
expectations would imply forecasts are efficient in that they do not display predictable errors.  
Essentially, tests for forecast efficiency look for correlations between forecast errors and 
observable variables, the existence of which implies that forecast errors are predictable and 
therefore not rational.  Tests applied include identifying:   
 
• non-zero mean in forecast errors; 
 
• serial correlation in forecast errors; 
 
• significant correlation between forecast errors and a constant and the forecast itself; 
and 
 
• tests of correlation between forecast errors and a set of variables (assumed to be the 
information set). 
 
Outside real estate, there is an extensive literature on the interlinked definition and causes of 
forecast failure.  If we define forecast failure in terms of simple ex post differences between 
forecasts and actual outcomesi, Hendry and Clements (2003) argue that it is rarely forecasting 
models that are the most important cause of forecast failure.   Although it may in some 
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circumstances be attributable to factors such as inadequate theory and inaccurate 
observations, it mainly arises due to structural breaks in the patterns under study. As Hendry 
and Clement (2003, 303) state; “all econometric models are mis-specified, and all economies 
have been subject to unanticipated shifts”.  This produces a situation where model 
specification can be irrelevant to performance, in that correctly specified models can be 
outperformed by poorly specified models.  Consequently, from an ex ante perspective, 
Hendry and Clements (2003) make a distinction between measurable and un-measurable 
uncertainty.  The former is linked to the intrinsic error term inherent in econometric 
modellingii.  However, the error can provide a misleading indicator of actual forecast 
uncertainty, given the largely unknowable uncertainty caused by unanticipated shifts and 
shocks.   
 
Capstaff, Paudyal and Rees (2001) provide a comprehensive review of the empirical evidence 
on forecast accuracy among financial analysts’ forecasts of earnings per share.  They identify 
a number of findings consistent with other studies. Analysts tend to outperform time series 
models; be optimistic and can be reluctant to provide unfavourable forecasts; to over-react to 
positive information and under-react to negative information.  They propose incentive 
structures and behaviourial biases as potential explanations of systematic optimism. As noted, 
Capstaff et al (2001) is just one example of the much cited bias of equity analysts in 
optimistic forecasting of the performance of companies which are clients.  Among macro-
economic forecasters, Laster et al (1999) found that in selecting forecast outcomes, 
forecasters are motivated not merely by forecast accuracy, but also by potential publicity for 
their firm.  Accordingly, where the rewards from the publicity attached to being accurate are 
relatively higher, forecasters are more likely to differentiate their views from the consensus, 
deliberately biasing their forecasts; a form of “rational” bias.  The balance between the 
attractions of publicity and a requirement for accuracy provides conflicting pressures for 
divergence and convergence (herding) forecasts.  In a discussion of how forecasters may be 
biased, Croushore (1997, 6) mentions “publicity effects” and suggests that : 
 
“some (survey) respondents might shade their forecasts more toward the consensus (to    
 avoid unfavourable publicity when wrong), whilst others might make unusually bold    
 forecasts to stand out from the crowd.” 
 
 
FORECAST DISAGREEMENT 
 
Bomberger (1996) examines disagreement and uncertainty in forecasts.  Disagreement is 
defined in terms of a measure of the ex ante dispersion of individual forecasts around the 
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mean forecast, whereas uncertainty is defined in terms of the ex post dispersion of individual 
forecasts around the actual.  Whilst the two concepts are integrally related, a distinction is 
also drawn between individual and consensus uncertainty.  The uncertainty of an individual 
forecast is greater than the uncertainty of the mean forecast.  In an analysis of long-term 
inflation expectations, Bomberger (1996) finds that it is errors in the consensus forecasts 
rather than disagreement that are the dominant component of individual forecast uncertainty.  
However, it should also be noted that observed disagreement among forecasters may 
underestimate actual disagreement.  Supporting the forecast smoothing hypothesis, Gallimore 
and McAllister (2005) found that professional real estate forecasters in the UK often engage 
in “self-censorship” or are “censored” when models generate contentious or conspicuous 
forecasts.  This distrust of “big numbers” may be a rational bias, given the range of 
uncertainties about the inputs and the models; in addition to the reputational risks. 
 
In explaining forecast disagreement, Williams (2003) draws upon theories of rational 
heterogeneity of beliefs which assume that agents have at their disposal a range of forecasting 
models, but are uncertain as to which model or models to use.  Consequently, they adaptively 
update their model choice or priors over the various models based on forecasting 
performance.  In essence, it is argued that idiosyncratic differences in agents’ characteristics, 
(e.g. different initial conditions in model priors and costs to learning new models) implies that 
a range of models will be in use at any point in time.  Linden (2003, 5) expresses the point, 
arguing that “forecasters have both different types and different amounts of information to 
form their beliefs”.   
 
Subjectivity is intrinsic to real estate forecast formation and will generate disagreement 
among real estate forecasters.  It has been recognised that differences in real estate forecasts 
occur due to differences in the structure of the econometric models, statistical procedures and 
data used (Mitchell and McNamara, 1997).  In the UK, Gallimore and McAllister (2005) 
argue that judgement is pervasive in the forecast formation process occurring in (econometric) 
model formation, due to variations in choice of causal variables, data selection and treatment, 
and constant and parameter specification.  Additionally, in a survey of professional 
forecasters, they found that the output of mechanical models is rarely the final forecast.  Pure 
model output is usually amended, as it is mediated and contested within organisations and 
forecasters themselves (who, as noted above, often have incentives to avoid conspicuous 
forecasts).  Similarly, in the US, Guilkey (1999) investigated the practice of US real estate 
market forecasters in terms of their parameters, methodology and output, and identified 
significant differences in the variables used, model specifications and the exogenous variables 
which are obtained from macro-economic forecast providers.  He found disagreement 
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amongst forecasters, concluding that real estate forecasters “get to their conclusions using 
very different methodologies and obtain very different MSA rankings” (Guilkey, 1999, 40).   
 
There is also a body of work that tests for consensus in forecasts.  The standard definition of 
‘consensus’ is “an agreement of opinion”.  Where a statistical measure of consensus is being 
sought, measures of central tendency are typical.  However, a more sophisticated 
deconstruction of consensus can be identified in the literature.  Byrne and Lee (1999) argue 
that central tendency statistics do not robustly reflect the presence or absence of agreement.  
Following Schnader and Stekler (1979), they suggest that a consensus is present when 
forecasts are relatively close to each other and that no consensus exists if there is wide 
disagreement among the forecasts in a given cross-section.  Analysis of the distributional 
properties of forecasts is necessary to enable an assessment as to whether a consensus exists.  
Byrne and Lee (1999) adapt a sequential test from Schnader and Stekler (1991) which puts a 
check for normality as the key test for consensus.  However, even if normality is not present, 
it is argued that the lack of a consensus requires skewness (indicating a significant minority 
dissenting opinion).  If skewness is not present, then significant platykurtosis must be present 
(if a distribution is leptokurtic, then there is even more clustering around the mean than when 
the distribution is normal). 
 
Previous analyses suggest that forecast disagreement may contain useful signals and 
information about market performance. Examining hypotheses generated by price-optimism 
models, Diether et al (2002) find that the bigger the disagreement in analysts’ forecasts of a 
stock’s returns, the lower its future returns.  Their central hypothesis is that optimistic buyers 
bias prices positively and cause future underperformance.  Focussing on inflation forecasts, 
Mankiw et al (2003) identified under-reaction to information when forming expectations 
about inflation.  They find that forecast disagreement rises with inflation and when inflation 
changes sharply.  They suggest that disagreement about future inflation moves together with 
other macro-economic variables raising “the possibility that disagreement may be a key to 
macro-economic dynamics”.  Bomberger (1996) finds that forecast disagreement can act as a 
proxy for forecast uncertainty, so that there is a positive relationship between the forecast 
errors and forecast disagreement at the time of the forecasts. Looking at individual 
forecasters, Cooper et al (1999) distinguished between lead or dominant forecasters and 
follower forecasters.  They argued that it was rational for less informed forecasters to delay 
publication of forecasts. Linden (2003) investigates patterns of asymmetries in forecast 
disagreement and their relationship with future performance.  In essence, it is argued that 
significant skewness in distributions of forecasts can signal upside and downside risk, 
depending on market conditions. 
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In summary, this paper is concerned with assessing the nature and extent of the ex ante 
phenomenon of disagreement in real estate forecasts and assessing ex post the accuracy of 
consensus forecasts and the individual forecasts that comprise the consensus (if it is formally 
present).   There is ample evidence from the capital markets and macro-economic forecasts to 
argue that disagreement and error are intrinsic to forecasting. Overall, the more interesting 
questions relate to the quantity and pattern of disagreement and error in real estate forecasts 
and the signals in and consequences of these aspects of forecast uncertainty. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Real estate forecasts for the UK over 1999-2004 were obtained from the Investment Property 
Forum (IPF) Survey of Independent Forecasts: UK Property Investment (IPF, 2004), as well 
as individual forecasters’ values confidentially provided by the IPF. The IPF is a major real 
estate industry group in the UK and represents the interests of those involved in commercial 
real estate investment.  With over 1400 members, including investment surveyors, fund 
managers, academics, bankers, lawyers, actuaries and related professionals, the IPF’s 
objective is to enhance the knowledge, understanding and efficiency of real estate as an 
investment by undertaking research and special projects, providing education for members, 
and encouraging discussion and debate amongst those concerned with real estate investment 
in the UK (see www.ipf.org.uk). 
 
The IPF real estate forecast surveys have been conducted since November 1998 and have 
been conducted quarterly (February, May, August and November) since 1999iii.  These IPF 
expert-opinion forecasting surveys collect information on future rental growth, capital 
growth and total returns from a range of UK real estate forecasters, including real estate 
advisors, fund managers and equity brokers.  These rental growth, capital growth and total 
return forecasts are presented at the “total” UK property level, with office, retail and 
industrial property sub-sector forecast results not available.   
 
Typically, 18-31 real estate forecasters participate in this quarterly survey, with an average of 
24 participants per IPF real estate forecasting survey over 1998-2004.  Details of the 
November 2004 IPF real estate forecasts survey, including participants, are shown in Exhibit 
1. The participants involved further reinforces the breadth of the UK real estate forecasting 
community that respond to this IPF survey. Building upon Newell et al (2003), this study 
analyses the individual forecasts that create the consensus forecasts.   
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 Inevitably, the analysis of individual forecaster consistency is hindered by organisational 
and personnel changes over the study period.  Over 1998-2004, the IPF survey has seen new 
contributing organisations emerge, previous contributors leave (and sometimes re-emerge) 
and existing contributors merge with other existing contributors. This means that for a total 
of 46 contributors, there are only 10 who contributed for the full six years. There have also 
been changes in personnel within the various forecasting teams over this time period.   
 
EXHIBIT 1: IPF SURVEY OF INDEPENDENT FORECASTS : RESPONDENT 
PROFILE : NOVEMBER 2004 
 
Period of surveys: 1998-2004 
Frequency of survey : quarterly (typically February, May, August, November) 
Property parameters surveyed: rental growth, capital growth, total returns 
Number of participantsiv: 27 
• property advisors: 12 
• fund managers: 11 
• equity brokers: 4 
Participants: 
• Property advisors: ATIS REAL Weatheralls, CB Richard Ellis, Cluttons, Colliers CRE, CVA 
Grimley, Cushman & Wakefield Healey & Baker, Knight Frank, Real Estate Forecasting, 
PMA, Experian Business Strategies, IPD, King Sturge 
• Funds managers: Arlington Property Investors, Deutsche Asset Management, Henderson 
Global Investors, LaSalle Investment Management, Legal and General Investment 
Management, Prudential Property Investment Managers, Standard Life Investments, Cordea 
Savills, ING Real Estate Investment Management, Invesco, Scottish Widows Investment 
• Equity brokers: Merrill Lynch, UBS, Morgan Stanley 
 
 
Previous US real estate forecasting studies (e.g. Guilkey, 1999) have indicated that this type 
of real estate forecasting data is not readily available for the US. Similarly, some US survey-
based real estate forecasts (eg: IRRs, cap rates, yields) are available from the Korpacz Real 
Estate Investment Survey (see www.pwcreval.com) and the Real Estate Research 
Corporation (see www.rerc.com).  Grissom and DeLisle (1998) provide details of the 
Korpacz and Real Estate Corporation forecasting surveys. However, neither of these US 
forecasting surveys provide the necessary depth nor time series structure of forecasts 
comparable to the UK IPF real estate forecasting surveys. As such, no equivalent consensus 
expert-opinion real estate forecast surveys are available in the other mature real estate 
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markets, such as the US or Australia. Hence this IPF survey represents a unique real estate 
forecasting service and expert-opinion real estate forecasting database. 
 
In each IPF survey, participants are asked to forecast real estate performance (rental growth, 
capital growth and total returns) to the end of the current year, as well as forecast these real 
estate performance measures to the end of the year for the next two years. The ‘target’ is the 
IPD All Property Index.  This sees real estate forecasts presented for up to thirty months 
ahead.  With these IPF surveys conducted quarterly, this sees subsequent real estate forecasts 
presented for forecast lead times of 30M, 27M, 24M, …, 6M, 3M, 0M; thus allowing the 
assessment of the accuracy of real estate forecasting as the time difference between the real 
estate forecast and the actual real estate performance reduces on a quarterly basis from thirty 
months to zero months.  
 
The IPF UK real estate forecasts were then compared with the respective Investment Property 
Databank (IPD) actual UK annual real estate returns (IPD, 2005a).  The IPD real estate 
indices represent the commercial real estate performance benchmarks for the UK. The IPD 
annual database is the most reliable benchmark of direct real estate performance in the UK. It 
comprises approximately 11,000 properties with a total value of over £121 billion at 
December 2004 (see Exhibit 2: Panel A), equivalent to 45% of the total real estate assets of 
UK investing institutions and listed real estate companies.  Full details of the IPD UK real 
estate indices are available from www.ipdindex.co.uk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EXHIBIT 2: IPD UK PROPERTY INDEX PORTFOLIOS: DECEMBER  2004 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A: Annual index 
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Property   Number of          Value of portfolio  Percentage of 
portfolio component properties     portfolio value 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Office       2,947      £33.3 billion   27.6% 
Retail       4,359      £64.4 billion   53.3% 
Industrial      2,966      £19.3 billion    16.0% 
Other           714                    £3.8 billion     3.1% 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Total                 10,986                 £120.8 billion   100.0%  
 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B: Monthly index 
Property   Number of       Value of portfolio  Percentage of 
portfolio component properties     portfolio value 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Office           736       £6.3 billion   23.6% 
Retail         1,465                           £15.5 billion   58.1% 
Industrial                      756       £4.4 billion                           16.5% 
Other            143                              £0.5 billion     1.8% 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Total                    3,100                 £26.7 billion   100.0% 
Source: IPD (2005a,b)  
 
An interesting feature of the forecasting problem is that the forecasters are forecasting rental 
and capital growth and total return at a given number of points during that year.  As the year 
progresses, it would be expected that forecasting accuracy increases as the target end-of-year 
date becomes closer.  Additionally, real estate forecasters for the IPD Annual Index are 
informed by the IPD Monthly Indexv (IPD,2005b).  Although drawing from a different 
sample of properties (see Exhibit 2: panel B), this monthly index provides a monthly update 
on performance as the year progresses.  For example, the IPF August survey forecast is a 
forecast for the next five months, with the forecaster able to draw upon the recorded IPD 
monthly returns to June/July.  In effect, the forecasters are receiving regular signals about 
actual market returns that should enable them to update their real estate forecasts.  These 
implied forecasts also provide us with some insights about the efficiency of real estate 
forecasters in reacting to new information.  
 
 
RESULTS 
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The analysis of these forecasting results over 1999-2004 is performed at a macro level in this 
paper, with fuller analysis on individual forecaster performance to be carried out at a later 
stage in this research project.  
 
Forecast Disagreement 
In Exhibit 3, we present a summary of the one-year ahead forecasts for change (%) in rental 
and capital growth and total returnsvi. In each case, it is only based on the real estate forecast 
in February for the end-of-year returns; consideration of subsequent quarterly updated 
forecasts (at May, August and November) are not assessed in this section.  
 
Forecast disagreement is indicated by the range between the maximum and minimum 
forecasts and the standard deviation of forecasts.  Similarities are a prevailing theme. The 
median and the mean forecast tend to be similar, providing a preliminary indication of 
normality in the distribution of forecasts.  The range between maximum and minimum for 
forecasts tend to remain relatively constant over the period.  Additionally, the standard 
deviation of forecasts remains relatively stable from year to year.  This suggests that the level 
of disagreement among forecasters is relatively stable for one year-ahead forecasts.  Although 
the ranges appear large, it is apparent that around three quarters of the forecasts for total 
return are typically within 1.5% of the mean. 
 
Further, the evidence of a consensus among forecasters is strong.  In all but one case, the 
annual distribution of the forecasts is normal for all forecasts.  The only clear-cut exception is 
the rental growth forecast for 2002, when the distribution is significantly non-normal and 
there is significant negative skewness in the forecast for rental growth.  This may reflect 
negative sentiment following the perceived increase in downside risks following 9/11 in 2001.  
Likewise, the forecasts for 1999 display similar characteristics.  The rejection of non-
normality is marginal and there is significant negative skewness.  Again, this may reflect 
increased negative sentiment following the perceived growth in downside risks following the 
financial market turmoil in the second half of 1998 associated with the Russian debt crisis and 
the collapse of Long Term Capital Management.  However, these factors only feature in rental 
growth forecasts and strong evidence of consensus remains about total returns and capital 
growth in both 1999 and 2002. 
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EXHIBIT 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR IPF FORECASTS: 1999 - 2004 
       
RENTAL GROWTH FORECAST (% p.a.)    
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
       
 Mean 3.26 4.86 4.65 0.18 -0.88 -0.27 
 Median 4.00 5.00 4.65 0.55 -0.70 -0.10 
 Maximum 7.10 7.50 7.10 2.10 1.40 1.00 
 Minimum -2.00 2.00 2.70 -4.00 -3.00 -2.00 
 Range 9.10 4.50 4.40 6.10 4.40 3.00 
 Std. Dev. 2.32 1.31 1.34 1.36 1.25 0.86 
 Skewness -0.99 -0.18 0.12 -1.40 -0.10 -0.31 
 Kurtosis 3.35 2.44 1.83 4.94 2.49 2.47 
       
 Jarque-Bera 4.39 0.58 1.48 11.59 0.21 0.70 
 Probability 0.11 0.75 0.48 0.00 0.90 0.70 
       
 Observations 26 31 25 24 17 25 
       
CAPITAL GROWTH FORECAST (% p.a.)    
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
       
 Mean 2.21 5.68 3.19 0.40 -0.78 1.04 
 Median 2.50 5.70 3.00 0.30 0.00 1.00 
 Maximum 7.00 10.00 6.60 2.70 1.80 4.00 
 Minimum -4.00 3.00 1.00 -3.00 -3.20 -2.00 
 Range 11.00 7.00 5.60 5.70 5.00 6.00 
 Std. Dev. 2.56 1.62 1.22 1.38 1.46 1.37 
 Skewness -0.59 0.35 0.55 -0.63 -0.44 0.01 
 Kurtosis 3.04 3.06 3.92 3.22 2.13 2.73 
       
 Jarque-Bera 1.53 0.65 2.16 1.63 1.20 0.07 
 Probability 0.47 0.72 0.34 0.44 0.55 0.96 
       
 Observations 26 31 25 24 19 25 
       
TOTAL RETURN FORECAST (% p.a.)  
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
       
 Mean 9.40 12.78 10.38 7.31 6.07 7.97 
 Median 10.00 13.00 10.00 7.40 6.25 8.00 
 Maximum 15.00 17.00 14.90 9.20 8.30 10.10 
 Minimum 3.00 10.00 6.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 
 Range  12.00 7.00 8.90 4.20 5.30 5.10 
 Std. Dev. 2.62 1.61 1.91 1.22 1.45 1.26 
 Skewness -0.46 0.45 0.32 -0.14 -0.54 -0.43 
 Kurtosis 3.29 3.30 3.65 2.33 2.42 2.67 
       
 Jarque-Bera 1.00 1.14 0.87 0.55 1.12 0.89 
 Probability 0.61 0.57 0.65 0.76 0.57 0.64 
       
 Observations 26 31 25 25 18 25 
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Forecast Accuracy 
As discussed above, there are many dimensions to forecast accuracy.  Firstly, we focus on the 
simple differences between forecasts and actual outcomes. Exhibit 4 illustrates the accuracy 
of the one year-ahead forecasts for rental and capital growth and total returns.  At this level of 
analysis, it is clear that it is errors in capital growth that are driving the errors in total return. 
This suggests that forecasted rental growth is the key determinant of forecasted capital 
growth.   
 
Essentially, forecasters are assuming stable capitalization rates in their forecasts of capital 
growth.  The correlation coefficient between rental growth and capital growth is 0.88 
(significant at 5% level).  This is consistent with research on the real estate forecasting 
process, which suggests that forecasters have limited confidence in their ability to forecast 
capitalization rates (see Gallimore and McAllister, 2005).   
 
The largest consensus forecasting failure was in 2004.  All forecasting organisations failed to 
anticipate the fall in capitalization rates that produced high levels of capital growth in that 
year.  The mean forecast for capital growth in 2004 was 1.03%, with a standard deviation of 
1.37% and a maximum of 4%.  This compares to recorded capital growth of 11.04%.  The 
mean absolute error in one-year ahead total return forecasts for the six years between January 
1999 and December 2004 was 4.87%.   Given the existence of consensus and the relatively 
low dispersion about the mean, for total returns, the largest contributor to individual forecast 
error was consensus uncertainty rather than individual forecast uncertainty. 
 
Not surprisingly, forecasts became more accurate the closer the forecast was to the end of the 
year.  As noted above, the information provided by the monthly index provides forecasters 
with valuable information about the likely out-turn at the end of the calendar year.  It is clear 
from Exhibit 5, that the February forecasts display the highest level of absolute error, whilst 
the November forecasts display the lowest.  Almost invariably, there is an increase in 
accuracy as the year progresses.   
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EXHIBIT 4 : FORECAST ACCURACY : 1999 - 2004 
 
Forecast Accuracy - Rental growth one year-ahead
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Forecast Accuracy - Capital growth one year-ahead
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Forecast Accuracy - Total return one year-ahead
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 Forecast bias 
Exhibit 6 shows the average percentage errors for the IPF forecasting data over 1999-2004.  
This graph provides preliminary support for a number of conclusions about the related 
concepts of bias and efficiency in real estate forecasts; namely: 
 
• Forecasts display evidence of systematic bias.  When performance was improving, 
total returns tended to be systematically underestimated.  Conversely, when 
performance was deteriorating, total returns tended to be systematically 
overestimated. 
• Indicating inefficiency, there is clear serial correlation in the forecast errors.  For 
instance, the mean (raw) errors in the consensus forecasts for total returns have a 
serial correlation of 0.71 (significant at 5% level). 
 
• Despite the information in the IPD monthly index, the bias in the forecast errors 
tends to continue.  Initial over-estimations or under-estimations at the beginning of 
the calendar year invariably persist, providing evidence of inefficiency amongst real 
estate forecasters. 
 
As noted earlier, as the calendar year progresses, forecasters have periodic monthly updates 
from IPD on achieved performance. As such, it is also possible to estimate the implied 
forecasts by extracting recorded performance to the date of the forecasts and comparing it to 
the actual performance over the remaining period.  For instance, in August 2004, the 
consensus forecast for total returns was 13.89%.  Given that recorded performance until July 
2004 was 9.24%, this can be interpreted as an implied forecast of approximately 4.5% for the 
period of August to December 2004.  Drawing again on the monthly index, the actual 
recorded performance for August to December 2004 was 9.5%.   
 
Exhibit 7 provides summary data on the accuracy and characteristics of the implied forecasts 
over 1999-2004.  They also display characteristics associated with forecast inefficiency.  The 
mean of the forecast errors is negative.  Given typically rising markets, this implies an 
element of lagging or inertia.  Further, there is strong evidence of forecast smoothing.  
Forecast errors are positively serially correlated and the standard deviation of actual returns is 
higher than forecast returns.   
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EXHIBIT 5 : CONSENSUS FORECAST : ABSOLUTE PERCENTAGE 
ERROR : 1999 - 2004 
 
Consensus Forecast Error (Absolute)1999-2004
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EXHIBIT 6 : CONSENSUS FORECAST : AVERAGE PERCENTAGE 
ERROR: 1999 - 2004 
 
Consensus Forecast (Average) Error (Total Returns) 1999-2004 
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EXHIBIT 7 : IMPLIED CONSENSUS FORECASTS : 1999 – 2004 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 Implied consensus forecasts (quarterly) 1999-2004 
 Rental growth Capital growth Total return 
Mean error -0.59% -1.89% -2.16% 
Volatility (actual) 2.12 3.05 4.16 
Volatility (forecast) 1.72 1.84 3.26 
Auto-correlation in errors 0.68 0.81 0.80 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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CONCLUSION 
Our review of the literature suggests that uncertainty and disagreement are inherent in the 
forecasting process.  Error is to be expected given the nature of an (econometric) estimate (as 
a point drawn from a probability distribution); problems of data availability and reliability in 
real estate markets; and the inherent limitations of econometric methods due, in particular, to 
the effects of structural shifts and unanticipated events.  Additionally, real estate forecasts are 
normally dependent upon ‘subsidiary’ forecasts of the independent (typically macro-
economic) variables which themselves will be subject to forecast error and, where two or 
more are procured, will display disagreement.  Previous research suggests that forecasts can 
often display evidence of bias and inefficiency.  Average errors may be non-zero, negative 
and positive errors may display persistence whilst forecasted volatility may lower than actual. 
 
The analysis of the UK real estate forecasters suggests that there is bias in real estate 
forecasts.      The mean of the forecast errors is non-zero. When performance was improving, 
total returns tended to be systematically underestimated.  Conversely, when performance was 
deteriorating, total returns tended to be systematically overestimated.  There is evidence of 
forecast smoothing.  The volatility of forecasted returns was invariably lower than the 
volatility of actual returns.  Inefficiency is apparent in that forecast errors are positively 
serially correlated.  Despite, having periodic updates with which to update forecasts, where 
the first annual consensus forecast was initially too pessimistic (optimistic), the final annual 
consensus forecast was also too pessimistic (optimistic).   
  
Probably the most robust finding of the analysis so far is that real estate forecasters display 
the characteristics associated with a consensus.  This seems to indicate herding among 
forecasters.  Disagreement amongst forecasters is limited.  For one year-ahead forecasts of 
total returns, the actual outcome was always outside one standard deviation of the mean 
forecast.  This suggests that consensus uncertainty rather than disagreement has been key 
driver of individual forecast uncertainty.  A key source of error in the forecasts seems to have 
been the implied use of naïve forecasts of capitalization rates.  The fact that capital growth 
tended to ‘mirror’ rental growth at the consensus level indicated that forecasters’ expectations 
of capital returns were generally a product of rental return expectations.  Basically, forecasters 
seemed to assume ‘no or little change’ in capitalization rates.  This probably reflects the 
increased difficulties of modelling capitalization rates relative to rental growth.   
   
The data set offers plenty of scope for further analysis.  This paper has not fully explored 
whether the patterns identified in the consensus forecasts can be confirmed at the level of the 
individual forecaster.  There may also interesting distinctions between categories of forecaster 
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and time period of forecast.  More formal econometric analysis for the existence of bias and 
inefficiency in the forecasts needs to be carried out if the conclusions are to be robust. 
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i Evidence from UK real estate forecasters suggests that they would regard such a measure as a crude 
indicator of forecast success.  Gallimore and McAllister (2005) find that most real estate forecasters 
regarded identifying the relative rather than absolute performance as the best indicator of success. 
Reflecting the preferences of many UK real estate forecasters, Granger and Pesaran (1999, 538) 
advocate a decision theoretical approach to forecast evaluation where there is a “consideration of the 
linkage between the modeler who produces forecasts and the decision maker who consumes them” in 
order to compare the relative usefulness of forecasts.   
ii As a result there is growing interest in communicating results in terms of probability density 
functions.  
iii No survey was conducted in February 1999. 
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iv Some survey respondents are unnamed for confidentiality reasons. 
v There are typically minor differences in performance between the two indices.  The monthly index 
consists of funds appraised on a monthly basis which are typically unitised funds.  The lot size tends to 
be smaller in such funds so that certain sectors do not have as large weights e.g. shopping centres, 
London offices.  
vi The 1999 forecast is based upon the November 1998 survey.  The greater disagreement in this year 
may reflect the fact that the forecast is earlier. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
